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SECRET

1978 VISIT OF PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER. ALTHOUGH THERE IS A TENDENCY TO BLAME THE UNITED STATES FOR VENEZUELA'S CURRENT FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE WOULD BE AIMED AT PRESIDENT CARTER, BUT RATHER THEY WOULD BE STAGED DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO EITHER EMBARRASS THE CURRENT VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OR TO FURTHER DRAMATIZE THE CAUSE BEING ADVOCATED. (SOURCE : A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.)

3. THE VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES RECOGNIZE THIS SITUATION AND EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE UNPLEASANT, ANTI-VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT INCIDENTS DURING PRESIDENT CARTER'S CARACAS VISIT. VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES BELIEVE THESE INCIDENTS WILL DEAL WITH CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION. THE SECURITY FORCES WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL ANY SITUATION THAT ARISES, THE AUTHORITIES BELIEVE. (SOURCE:

[REDACTED] (S)

I. THE VENEZUELAN LEFTIST GROUPS

(S)

SECRET

POLISH DIPLOMATS. (SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CONTACTS AMONG [SECURITY OFFICIALS] AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY (S) **SECRET** RELIABLE.)

5. VENEZUELAN EXTREME LEFTIST GROUPS INCLUDE THE BANDERA ROJA (BR); THE BANDERA ROJA-MARXIST/LENINIST (BR/MLLN ALSO KNOWN AS THE ANTONIO JOSE DE SUCRE GUERRILLA FRONT; THE ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (FALN), AND THE ORGANIZATION OF REVOLUTIONARIES (OR). THESE GROUPS HAVE BEEN OPERATING IN THE EASTERN VENEZUELAN STATES, PARTICULARLY MONAGAS, ANZOATEGUI, SUCRE AND BOLIVAR. THEY HAVE CARRIED OUT NUMEROUS RAIDS ON MILITARY POSTS, HAVE TAKEN OVER SMALL TOWNS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH THEY LECTURED THE TOWNS PEOPLE ON ANTI-GOVERNMENT POLITICAL THEMES, AND IN GENERAL HAVE HARRASSED AND EMBARRASSED THE GOVERNMENT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. (SOURCE:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.) (S)

6. DESPITE A LARGE-SCALE VENEZUELAN MILITARY COMMITMENT IN THE EASTERN STATES, THE GUERRILLAS REMAIN

(S)

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VIRTUALLY UNTOUCHED. THEY MOVE ABOUT THE TOWNS AND CITIES OF THE AREA RELATIVELY FREELY AND GENERALLY ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL CITIZENS. FOR THE MOST PART, THEY ARE NATIVES OF THE AREA, OR THROUGH THE YEARS HAVE SPENT A GOOD DEAL OF TIME THERE, HAVE MUCH IN COMMON WITH THE LOCAL PEOPLE, AND, IN SHORT, ARE MORE FRIENDLY AND THUS MORE WELCOME THAN THE GOVERNMENT SECURITY AND MILITARY PEOPLE. ESTIMATES OF THEIR STRENGTH RANGE FROM 50 TO 150 INDIVIDUALS. (SOURCE: [redacted])

[redacted] WHOSE(S) REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

7. THE GOVERNMENT'S OWN HEAVY HANDED METHODS IN DEALING WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION, HAVE, IN TURN, HARMED THE GOVERNMENT'S IMAGE IN THE AREA FAR MORE THAN THE GUERRILLAS COULD HAVE HOPED TO DO WITH THEIR OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY CLAIMS TO HAVE CAPTURED SEVERAL GUERRILLA LEADERS RECENTLY, THE PRISONERS ARE ILLITERATE FARM WORKERS WHO CLEARLY ARE NOT TRAINED GUERRILLA FIGHTERS. THOSE WHO FEEL THAT THEY HAVE BEEN VICTIMIZED BY THE SECURITY FORCES, TURN AWAY FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND TOWARD THE GUERRILLAS. MANY OF THOSE WHO ARE NOT

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SECRET

DIRECTLY AFFECTED ALSO LOSE RESPECT FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT WHICH, WHILE MISTREATING THE CITIZENRY, FAILS TO ERADICATE THE GUERRILLAS. DIRECTLY AFFECTED ALSO LOSE RESPECT FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT WHICH, WHILE MISTREATING THE CITIZENRY, FAILS TO ERADICATE THE GUERRILLAS. **SECRET**
INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY. (SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN PROFESSIONAL MAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN [SECURITY AND JUDICIAL] (S) CIRCLES AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

8. DURING THE PAST TWO TO THREE MONTHS THE GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY INACTIVE. VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES HAD BELIEVED THAT AFTER SPENDING AN ENJOYABLE HOLIDAY SEASON, THE GUERRILLAS WOULD RESUME THEIR CAMPAIGN IN FEBRUARY. THIS HAS NOT MATERIALIZED AND SECURITY OFFICIALS ARE NOW ATTEMPTING TO DISCOVER WHETHER THE GUERRILLAS HAVE TAKEN COVER AS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS IN THE EASTERN STATES OR ARE REGROUPING AND PLANNING TO RENEW THEIR ACTIVITIES SOON. (SOURCE: [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] (S)

9. IN LATE FEBRUARY, HOWEVER, VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT BR LEADER GABRIEL PUERTA APONTE AND SEVERAL OTHER GUERRILLA LEADERS WERE IN CARACAS.

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PUERTA AND THE OTHERS ARE BELIEVED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH

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UNSPECIFIED EXTREME LEFTIST ELEMENTS AND PLANS FOR THE SHIFTING OF THE GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN TO THE URBAN AREAS ARE BEING MADE. (SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CONTACTS AMONG [SECURITY OFFICIALS] AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY (S) RELIABLE.)

10. THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT STILL BELIEVES THAT THE 26 FEBRUARY 1976 KIDNAPPING OF UNITED STATES BUSINESSMAN WILLIAM F. NIEHOUS WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE BR, FALN AND THE OR WORKING JOINTLY. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT HAS IMPRISONED SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS FOR THEIR SUPPOSED INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPING, THE CASE REMAINS UNRESOLVED AND NIEHOUS' WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. (SOURCE: [REDACTED])
[REDACTED] (S)

11. IN ADDITION TO THEIR RURAL MILITARY APPARATS, THE BR, OR AND FALN MAINTAIN QUASI- LEGAL FRONT GROUPS WHICH ARE ACTIVE IN THE URBAN AREAS. THE BR HAS NUMEROUS CIVIC

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SECRET

AWARENESS GROUPS SUCH AS THE COMMITTEE AGAINST THE HIGH COST OF LIVING, THE STUDENT'S COMMITTEE FOR THE POPULAR STRUGGLE (CLEP), ETC. THE OR MAINTAINS A FRONT GROUP KNOWN AS THE SOCIALIST LEAGUE (LS, WHICH, IN TURN HAS ORGANIZED THE UNITED POPULAR STUDENT MOVMENT (MEUP). THE FALN'S LESS SUCCESSFUL FRONT IS RUPTURA . CLEP, MEUP AND RUPTURA HAVE WORKED TOGETHER TO ORGANIZE THE RECENT STUDENT DISTURBANCES WHICH BEGAN IN MID-FEBRUARY. FURTHERMORE, WHILE THERE IS NO PROOF, VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THE FRONT GROUPS ARE NOW RECEIVING SUPPORT AND DIRECTION FROM ABROAD. VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS EXPECT THESE DISTURBANCES TO CONTINUE AND INDEED INCREASE UNTIL AFTER THE DECEMBER ELECTION. (SOURCE: [REDACTED] (S))

12. IN DISCUSSING THE STUDENT DISTURBANCES, RETIRED GENERAL RAUL G I M E N E Z GAINZA, HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), SAID THAT HE FULLY EXPECTS THE DEMONSTRATIONS TO CONTINUE FOR SOMETIME. FURTHERMORE, HE OPINED THAT THE POLICE HAVE AS YET NOT REALLY BEEN CALLED OUT IN FORCE TO HANDLE THE

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PAGE 2 RUEAIIA 9330 [REDACTED] NOFORN WNINTEL
HAVE NOT ENGAGED IN LOOTING. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, HE PREDICTED,
THE NATIONAL GUARD WOULD QUICKLY BE CALLED OUT IN FORCE, SUCH
A MOVE, HOWEVER, COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN SERIOUS INJURIES AND
A DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION. (SOURCE: A PROFESSIONAL
MAN WITH CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN [SECURITY OFFICIALS] AND WHOSE (S)
REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

SECRET

II. CUBAN EXILES

13. THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IS LARGE, WELL-ESTABLISHED
AND INFLUENTIAL. FURTHERMORE, IT CURRENTLY FEELS BETRAYED AND
REJECTED BY BOTH THE USG AND THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT. IN
THE FORMER CASE, THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IS CONCERNED BY THE
USG'S EXPANDED FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.
WITH REGARD TO THE GOV, THE EXILES HAVE COME TO DISTRUST
THE PEREZ ADMINISTRATION WHICH THEY FEEL HAS UNJUSTLY
HARRASSED THE COMMUNITY SINCE THE 6 OCTOBER 1976
BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINE, SUPPOSEDLY BY CUBAN EXILE EXTREMISTS.
THE FAIRLY RECENT INSTANCE IN WHICH THE GOV REVOKED THE
VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP OF A WELL-KNOWN CUBAN PHYSICIAN IN RETALIATION

(14)

SECRET

BOTH THE GOV AND THE EXILE COMMUNITY FEAR THAT, SHOULD HE DIE,
EXILE EXTREMISTS WILL MOVE SWIFTLY AND STRONGLY AGAINST PRESIDENT
PEREZ. BOSCH HIMSELF HAS SAID THAT PRESIDENT PEREZ WILL BE HELD
PERSONALLY ACCOUNTABLE FOR HIS DEATH. (SEE [HVC] 7858, (S)
TDFIRDB-315/02855-78.) (SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH
CONTACTS AMONG CUBAN EXILES AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY
RELIABLE.)

16. A RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBER OF FORMER CUBAN
CITIZENS HOLD INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS WITHIN THE VENEZUELAN
SECURITY SERVICES. AMONG THESE ARE ORLANDO GARCIA,
DISIP'S CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, AND RICARDO MORALES, A
FORMER DISIP SECTION CHIEF AND A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF GARCIA.
MORALES HAS IN THE PAST INDICATED HIS BELIEF THAT THE USG
IS IN SOME MEASURE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS CURRENT PROBLEMS AND
ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HAS MADE THREATENING REMARKS TOWARD USG
PERSONNEL IN VENEZUELA. WHILE MORALES NO LONGER HOLDS AN
OFFICIAL POSITION IN DISIP, HE DOES MAINTAIN SOME DISIP
CONNECTIONS. MORALES TRAVELS ABROAD FREQUENTLY AND IS
CURRENTLY BELIEVED TO BE OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. (SOURCE:

(16)

CJA-
VENEZUELA

SECRET

A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN

(SECURITY OFFICIALS) AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY
RELIABLE.) (S)**SECRET**

17. THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT MORALES RECENTLY THREATENED THE LIFE OF DIEGO ARRIBA, VENEZUELAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND TOURISM, WHILE ARRIBA WAS TRAVELLING ABROAD. THE COMMUNITY HAS IN THE PAST SUSPECTED MORALES TO BE AN AGENT OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT. SINCE THEY FEEL THAT ARRIBA IS A RATHER UNLIKELY TARGET FOR CUBAN EXTREMISTS, THE COMMUNITY BELIEVES THAT MORALES' THREAT, IF INDEED MADE, IS POSSIBLY A CUBAN GOVERNMENT ATTEMPT TO FURTHER DISCREDIT THE EXILE COMMUNITY IN VENEZUELA. (SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CONTACTS AMONG CUBAN EXILES AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

VENZUELA

II. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

18. ILICH "CARLOS" RAMIREZ SANCHEZ, THE NOTORIOUS

(17)

SECRET

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST, IS A VENEZUELAN CITIZEN WHOSE FAMILY RESIDES IN SAN CRISTOBAL, TACHIRA STATE. THERE HAS BEEN PAST INFORMATION THAT RAMIREZ' ASSOCIATES OCCASIONALLY TRAVEL TO VENEZUELA. THERE IS NO CURRENT INFORMATION INDICATING THAT "CARLOS" HIMSELF OR ANY OF HIS CURRENT CLOSE ASSOCIATES ARE NOW IN VENEZUELA. (SOURCE: [REDACTED]) (S)

SECRET

19. JOHNY KHOURI, LATIN AMERICAN HEAD OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), RESIDES IN THE PORT CITY OF LA GUAIRA IN THE CARACAS FEDERAL DISTRICT. THE GOV IS AWARE OF KHOURI'S PRESENCE IN VENEZUELA AND HAS AGREED TO ALLOW HIM TO REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY WITH HIS FAMILY AS LONG AS HE DOES NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN PFLP OR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA. IN AN EFFORT TO ENSURE KHOURI'S COMPLIANCE, THE GOV OCCASIONALLY MONITORS HIS ACTIVITIES. AS IN THE PAST, DISIP WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PLACE KHOURI UNDER "PREVENTIVE DETENTION" DURING PRESIDENT CARTER'S VISIT.

(SOURCE: A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.)

20. IN ADDITION TO CUBAN EXILES, JEWISH AND ARAB GROUPS,

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CARTER'S VISIT. (SOURCE: A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.)

SECRET

IV. THE VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES

21. THE VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES, ESPECIALLY DISIP, HAVE BEEN HARD HIT BY PERSONAL RIVALRIES AMONG THEIR TOP OFFICIALS. PART OF DISIP'S DIFFICULTIES ARISE FROM CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT IN THE HANDLING OF THE ANTI-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN IN THE EASTERN STATES. ANOTHER PART STEMS FROM MUTUAL DISTRUST AND BACKBITING AMONG ITS LEADERS. DISIP'S EFFICIENCY, WHICH UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS IS NONE TOO GOOD, IS NOT UP TO ITS USUAL STANDARD. DISIP DIRECTOR GIMENEZ HAS VOICED HIS LACK OF FAITH IN THE YOUNGER GENERATION OF DISIP OFFICERS AND HAS EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE FOR A RETURN TO THE OLDER, MORE EXPERIENCED OFFICIALS. (SOURCE: [A VENEZUELAN PROFESSIONAL MAN] WITH CONTACTS (S) AMONG VENEZUELAN [SECURITY OFFICIALS] AND WHOSE REPORTING IS (S) GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

22. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR BOTH DISIP AND THE TECHNICAL JUDICIAL POLICE (PTJ) HAVE EXPERIENCED FUNDING

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SECRET

PROBLEMS WHICH, ACCORDING TO DISIP DIRECTOR GIMÉNEZ, ARE DUE TO THE GOV'S CURRENT BUDGET PROBLEMS COUPLED WITH POOR ADMINISTRATION. DURING JANUARY AND FEBRUARY BOTH AGENCIES WERE FORCED TO BORROW FROM FEDERAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO MEET THEIR PAYROLLS. EVEN SO, PAYROLL DISBURSEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE LATE. AS A RESULT, MORALE AMONG THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THESE AGENCIES IS LOWER THAN USUAL. (SOURCE: [A PROFESSIONAL MAN] WITH CONTACTS AMONG (S) VENEZUELAN [SECURITY OFFICIALS] AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY (S) RELIABLE.)

SECRET

23. THE DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (DIM) HAS NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN RECENT REORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL PROBLEMS AND IS GENERALLY STAFFED WITH CAREER MILITARY OFFICERS ON ROTATIONAL TOURS. DIM'S OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN STATES ARE CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION WHICH MAY, HOWEVER, CAUSE THIS SERVICE SOME PROBLEMS IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS TO COME.
(SOURCE: A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.)

24. VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE NOT YET BEGUN TO DO ANY SUBSTANTIAL PLANNING FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S VISIT, BELIEVING

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IT IS TOO EARLY TO DO SO. PRELIMINARY THOUGHT, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING A JOINT SPECIAL SECURITY COMMAND TO COORDINATE MILITARY, POLICE AND SECURITY UNITS ASSIGNED TO SAFEGUARDING PRESIDENT CARTER AND HIS PARTY. (SOURCE:

SECRET

[REDACTED]
I(s)

25. IN GENERAL, THE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE SERVICES TEND TO MAKE BOTH DIM AND DISIP LESS FORTHCOMING WITH AND TRUSTFUL OF OUTSIDERS. FURTHERMORE, THEY ARE SUSPICIOUS OF EACH OTHER AND MUTUAL COOPERATION IS LIMITED. DESPITE THESE LIMITATIONS, THE VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES ARE WELL DISPOSED TO AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY PROTECTION FOR AND COOPERATION WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND HIS PARTY. (SOURCE: A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.)

V. EMBASSY COMMENT

25. EMBASSY COMMENT: THE CHARGE HAS SEEN THIS REPORT AND HAS NO COMMENT TO ADD.)

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26. ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (2 MARCH 1978) FIELD #

[HVC] 7860. (S)

27. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFATT, FBI, SECRET SERVICE
CARACAS: SENT TO BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LAGOS, MONROVIA,
USCINCSO (J-2 ONLY).

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